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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC HOUSING
ADMISSIONS
In Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority,1 applicants for
public housing brought a class action in federal district court under
§ 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act 2 and the federal Constitution,
challenging the procedures employed by the defendant New York City
Housing Authority in admitting tenants to low-rent housing projects
managed by the Authority and financed by either state or local funds.3
The facts as alleged indicated that the regulations governing admis-
sion policies and procedures were not made available to prospective
tenants either by publication and distribution or by posting. "Appli-
cations received by the Authority [were] not processed chronologically,
or in accordance with ascertainable standards, or in any other reason-
able and systematic manner."4 These procedural deficiencies were
alleged to have deprived applicants of due process of law in violation
of the fourteenth amendment, since the alleged "defects increased
the likelihood of favoritism, partiality, and arbitrariness on the part of
1. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Jurisdiction of the
district court was based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343, which provides: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of
any State law, statute, ordinance ... of any right, privilege, or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
3. In federal-aided projects the Authority was required to allocate available
housing in accordance with an objective scoring system. 398 F.2d at 264-65.
4. 398 F.2d at 264. The court specifically found that the allegations evi-
denced these procedural defects: "All applications, whether or not considered and
acted upon by the Authority, expire automatically at the end of two years. A
renewed application is given no credit for time passed, or precedence over a first
application of the same date. There is no waiting list or other device by which
an applicant can gauge the progress of his case and the Authority refuses to di-
vulge a candidate's status on request. Many applications are never considered by
the Authority." Id.
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the Authority [and thereby deprived] plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to
petition for admission to public housing .... 5
The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim within the court's civil rights juris-
diction, and also refused to abstain from deciding the case. The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, holding: (1) since "due process requires that
selection among applicants [for public housing] be made in accordance
with 'ascertainable standards,' " plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief
under the Civil Rights Act; (2) "[a]s applicants for public housing,
[plaintiffs were] immediately affected by the alleged irregularities in
the practices of the Authority" 7 and therefore had standing to raise
their due process objection; and (3) plaintiffs' case was a proper one
for the exercise of jurisdiction by a federal district court.
I. FEDERAL CLAIM UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Two elements must be present in order to establish a claim under
§ 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act. First, the activity complained
of must have been conducted under color of state law. Second, such
activity must have subjected plaintiffs to the deprivation of the rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.8
A person's conduct is considered to be under color of state law if
he was "clothed with the authority of the state and [was] purporting
to act thereunder, whether or not the conduct complained of was
authorized or, indeed, even if it was proscribed by state law." An
allegation of a purpose to discriminate or to deprive one of any fed-
eral right is not essential to the statement of a claim under the statute
which is predicated on an alleged violation of the due process clause.10
5. Id. The constitutional claims in the complaint were directed at local regu-
lations (or lack thereof) issued by the Authority, and not toward any provision
of the New York Public Housing Law.
6. Id. at 265.
7. Id.
8. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Marshall v. Sawyer,
301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Roberts v.
Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
9. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962). See Classic v.
United States, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1912) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
10. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Cohen v. Morris, 300 F.2d 24(9th Cir. 1962), interpreting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943), as requiring
an allegation of clear and intentional discrimination under § 1983 only in the case
of a denial of equal protection of the laws and not in the case of a denial of due
process of law. The dissenting opinion in Holmes argued that a previous Second
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A plaintiff need only show that a deprivation of some right secured
by the Constitution has occurred.1"
Plaintiffs in Holmes established that the defendant Authority was
proceeding under color of state law, due to the fact that the Authority
was created by New York statute12 and was authorized to make rules
and regulations concerning the admission of tenants to public hous-
ing.13 With respect to the statutory requirement that plaintiff allege
a deprivation of a constitutional right, the court adopted the reasoning
of the Fifth Circuit in Hornsby v. Allen,' 4 which also involved a pro-
ceeding under the Civil Rights Act. That case held due process to
require city liquor licensing officials to conform to "ascertainable
standards"' 5 in their selection procedures, since due process requires
that "every applicant should be apprised of the qualifications neces-
sary to obtain a license. . . ."10 The Holmes court reasoned that since
due process required the Authority to make selections in accordance
with "ascertainable standards," plaintiffs' allegation of deficient selec-
tion procedures within the Authority stated a sufficient cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act.
Circuit case, Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1965), required an allega-
tion of intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights, but that case
is distinguishable in that the plaintiff claimed a denial of equal protection and not
due process of law.
11. Anderson v. Haas, 341 F.2d 497 (3rd Cir. 1965); Roberts v. Trapnell,
213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Stinger v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir.
1963).
12. N.Y. PuB. HOUSING LAw § 30 (McKinney 1955). Due to the fact that a
governmental agency was involved in Holmes, the issue of the Authority proceeding
under color of state law was not contested by defendants.
13. N.Y. PuB. HoUsING LAW § 37(1) (W) (McKinney 1955).
14. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
15. Id. at 612.
16. Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (on petition for re-
hearing). In reviewing licensing cases, the federal courts adhere to the rule that
an opportunity to a hearing "is required on issues of adjudicative facts when
important interests are at stake .... " However, courts, particularly state courts,
are often confused by the "privilege" concept, which involves the rule that "due
process protects only 'life, liberty or property' and not privileges [as distinguished
from rights] and that courts therefore are not called upon to require fair hearings
when nothing more than privileges are at stake." K. DAvis, ADAIINISTRATIVB LAv
§§ 7.11 & 7.18 (1959). In Holmes, the court reasoned that the deficient selec-
tion procedures deprived plaintiffs of a constitutional right, as distinguished from
a privilege, and therefore plaintiffs were entitled to a trial under the Civil Rights
Act.
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II. STANDING
Norwalk C.O.R.E. v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency' 7 involved a
class action by persons asserting that they had been subjected to dis-
crimination in connection with a city urban renewal project. The
project allegedly displaced persons within the renewal area without
making adequate provisions for low income housing elsewhere. The
Second Circuit held plaintiffs had standing to sue since their stake in
the outcome of the case was "immediate and personal, and the right
which they alleged [had] been violated."' 8 In Holmes, the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that plaintiffs, as applicants for public housing, were
"immediately affected by the alleged irregularities in the practices of
the Authority.. . "11, and were thus deprived of a fair opportunity for
admission to public housing. Therefore, plaintiffs had standing to
raise their due process objections."0 Thus, Holmes involved an appli-
cation of Norwalk C.O.R.E. by providing an opportunity for housing
applicants to contest deficient tenant selection procedures.
III. ABSTENTION
The doctrine of abstention concerns the circumstances in which a
federal court may decline to proceed though it has jurisdiction under
the Constitution and the federal statutes. 21 It "allows a federal court
whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked to postpone decision,
pending trial in a state court, when the result might turn on issues of
state law." -2 In Monroe v. Pape,23 an action charging a city police
officer with violating plaintiff's civil rights during an allegedly
unreasonable search and seizure, the Supreme Court held that the fed-
eral and state remedies in civil rights cases were supplementary, and
that a state remedy "need not be first sought and refused before the
17. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. Id. at 927.
19. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir.
1968).
20. See Banks v. Housing Authority of City and County of San Francisco,
120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Thomas v. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Little Rock, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
21. C. WiuosT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Judicial
Abstention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUiu. L. REv. 749
(1959).
22. Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 604, 607-11 (1966).
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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federal one [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983] is invoked."24 The Supreme
Court reaffirmed this decision in McNeese v. Board of Education,25
involving a suit by Negro public school pupils for equitable relief from
school segregation, where it held that the Civil Rights Act vested the
federal claimant with a right of immediate access to the federal courts,
regardless of whether state remedies existed.
Defendant in Holmes argued for abstention by contending that fed-
eral intervention would result in interference with problems of
uniquely local concern and would disrupt a complex state regulatory
system. Since plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief under the Civil
Rights Act, the court could have dismissed the abstention argument by
citing Monroe and McNeese. It chose instead to face the issue
squarely.
The court reasoned that the complaint waged only a very limited
attack on the admission procedures of the Authority and "in no sense
[sought] to interpose the federal judiciary as the arbiter of purely local
matters." 26 Plaintiffs were asserting a "narrow group of constitutional
rights based upon overriding federal policies, and ask[ed] federal in-
volvement only to the limited extent necessary to assure that state
administrative procedures comply with federal standards of due proc-
ess." 27 Federal involvement, the court continued, would not disrupt
the state regulatory process since the case arose as a result of a total
lack of any reasonable system for selecting public housing applicants.
The court concluded that since plaintiffs' remedy in the state courts-
mandamus-was "dubious at the very best,"28 the federal district court
was not required to abstain from deciding the case.29
CONCLUSION
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,30 Negro applicants for
public housing brought suit under the Civil Rights Act alleging that
24. Id. at 183. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963);
Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
26. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 266 (2d Cir.
1968).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 267. See Gimprich v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 401, 118 N.E.2d
578 (1954); Grand Jury Assn v. Schweitzer, 202 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1960).
29. See Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964);
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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the Chicago Housing Authority had intentionally chosen sites and
adopted tenant assignment procedures for public housing for the pur-
pose of maintaing existing patterns of residential segregation, thereby
depriving plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws. The court held
that plaintiffs were entitled to relief under § 1983. The element of
racial discrimination so important in Gautreaux is lacking in Holmes,
which established that an allegation of discrimination is not necessary
for a claim under § 1983-selection procedures are reviewable on fed-
eral constitutional grounds and must conform to the due process
requirement of "ascertainable standards."
The Second Circuit's refusal to abstain in Holmes is significant in
the context of the great demand for public housing. While abstention
may result in piecemeal adjudication, thereby delaying a decision on
the merits,3' the result in Holmes will assure a prompt decision in the
federal courts for those applying for the scarce supply of public hous-
ing.
John F. Birath, Jr.
31. See Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
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